Julian, An OSINT Investigator Exposing the Truth About Chinese Fentanyl

Fentanyl: a potent synthetic opioid drug 100x stronger than morphine and 100x stronger than heroin. The 2mg dose found in 42% of pills is enough to kill. In the USA, a 20-year cycle of growing fentanyl trafficking, use and abuse has now peaked in an average loss of 80,000 lives a year to overdose. This makes fentanyl a wildly disproportionate cause of casualties in America’s opioid epidemic. 

The DEA has tracked the influx of fentanyl imports to their source: China. Most fentanyl comes to the US from China, via both direct by-sea smuggling and notorious drug transports over the Mexican-American border. 

A House Committee has claimed the Chinese regime subsidizes this illegal trade. Chinese sources continue to claim that the export of fentanyl from China has been criminalized, not subsidized. To subsidize these substances, some with no legal use, amounts to the Chinese state profiting from American pain.

Julian* - a researcher associated with StrikeSource - reached out to tell us how OSINT Industries is helping investigators to expose the truth.

Meet Julian*, OSINT Industries User

A self-described “penetration tester by day… OSINT enthusiast by night”, Julian keeps close watch on “emerging threats to the Western world.” The open sale of narcotic precursors during a deadly opioid crisis naturally sparked Julian’s curiosity as an investigator.

While Julian’s investigation developed, the Biden administration announced an attempt to motivate Chinese cooperation on preventing fentanyl imports: the removal of sanctions on the Chinese Ministry of Public Security's Institute of Forensic Science, a company committing alleged abuses against Uyghur Muslims and other minorities.

Julian was struck immediately by this example of the US government’s ineffectuality - or even apathy - when it comes to tackling America’s biggest health crisis. Through his OSINT investigation, Julian could see that Biden’s controversial deal had improved nothing. China clearly was, and is, continuing to subsidize the export of fentanyl. 

Julian was able to reveal, through research with OSINT Industries, not only proof of Chinese culpability in manufacturing and selling fentanyl precursors on the open web - but, with some degree of certainty, that guilty actors were members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

‍

1: Making the Connection

At 5:37pm on December 29th 2023, Julian was Google dorking. He came across an individual advertising the sale of Xylazine  - a fentanyl precursor - on Soundcloud. Despite use of an alias, this individual, ‘A’*, was linked to an organization based in Wuhan: HYP Pharma.*  

Open business records for HYP Pharma revealed a domain: “hyp[.]com”*. It also revealed a range of corresponding email addresses and phone numbers. Julian said:

“With OSINT Industries… this is where it got interesting.”

HYP Pharma was a company selling fentanyl cutting agents (Xylazine) on the open internet. OSINT Industries searches identified seven associated aliases* for Chinese actors using social media platforms to advertise precursors and cutting agents for fentanyl and other narcotics. These aliases, alphabetised, were:

Using this intelligence, Julian was able to exploit typical OpSec failures to identify further related Chinese companies. These offered similar illicit or semi-illicit products for overt sale - namely, ingredients for illegal drugs:

1. ‘HYP Pharma’, a chemical distributor openly trafficking Xylazine on Soundcloud
2. ‘HuSing MNT Tech Ltd.’, a chemical distribution front organization
3. ‘Pharm HIT International’, another chemical distribution front 
4. ‘New Materials Silicone Co.’, a seemingly legitimate silicone manufacturer
5. Lastly, ‘Wuhan Bright Chemical Ltd.’, a Chinese multinational parent company, generating millions of dollars a year

Then, Julian’s months of OSINT research revealed something key. Job postings and Chinese business records for HYP Pharma - the business at the crux of this network - listed two individuals as primary shareholders: ‘GH’* (90%) and ‘MG’* (10%).

Julian was able to identify ‘MG’, with some degree of certainty, as an active member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) according to a breach of CCP member data from 2020. GH’s status remains unknown - despite appearing on the Shanghai Police Database.

With the help of OSINT Industries, Julian had established an undeniable connection between the CCP and fentanyl precursor distribution.

‍

2: Investigating the Aliases

Julian was not done yet. Alias ‘A’ warranted further investigation.

Julian's flow-chart displays Alias A's connections.

‍

OSINT Industries had showed Julian (via the phone number Alias ‘A’ used to advertise Xylazine) that LinkedIn, Facebook and other accounts connected Alias ‘A’ with Alias ‘B’ - and established not only advertisement for ‘HYP Pharma’, but employment at ‘HuSing MNT Tech Ltd’. 

This OSINT lead allowed Julian to investigate the distribution chemical ‘front’ companies under the ‘HYP Pharma’ umbrella. He found even these ‘fronts’ overtly trafficking in narcotic precursors.

A Gravatar profile revealed through searching ‘A’ on OSINT Industries showed the ‘HuSing’ distribution organization had two domain names associated with it: “whhusing[.]com” and “glycidatepmkbuypowder[.]com”*. The latter overtly refers to distributing a methamphetamine precursor. Through OSINT Industries email searches, Julian found all seven aliases connected to the former - the custom ‘whhusing[.]com’ domain.  

As of September 26th 2023, “whhusing[.]com” is still active and operational, openly trafficking “pharmaceutical intermediates” for fentanyl and other substances fuelling America’s opioid crisis.

Alias ‘B’s email connection to ‘pharm-hit[.]com’ gave Julian similar results with OSINT Industries. As of March 26th, 2024, ‘Pharm HIT International’ operates in the same criminal space, openly distributing precursors for not only fentanyl, but also MDMA. 

Once again, Julian had proved the China-US fentanyl connection: a nexus of narcotics businesses, selling precursors. With OSINT Industries, drive and smart detective work, a citizen investigator could observe these CCP-linked narcotic rings in-action. For Julian, this only underscored the US government’s complacency on fentanyl trafficking.

What shocked Julian most was that these organizations could operate in plain sight - on the open, clear web. 

3: Hiding in Plain Sight

While advertising fentanyl precursors for ‘HYP Pharma’, Alias ‘F’ included a second email address: ‘new.chem.tech@gmail[.]com’.* With OSINT Industries, ‘F’s simple OpSec mistake was the key to a whole new investigative angle.

Julian used OSINT Industries to discover this email address was attached to ”nmssilicone[.]com”*. Here, Julian found ‘F’ is the primary business contact for ‘New Materials Silicone Co.’, which presents itself as a legitimate silicone manufacturer.

OSINT Industries showed Julian that ‘F’ had another email associated with ‘New Materials Silicone’. This address, “princessa.export@gmail[.]com”*, was registered to a YouTube channel. Now Julian could add photos of a known trafficker to his collection of evidence.

Julian’s keen eye then noticed the OSINT profile card for ‘Wuhan Bright Chemical’ displayed the same logo on LinkedIn as ‘New Materials Silicone’. ‘Wuhan Bright Chemical’ was listed as the parent company of ‘New Materials’ on the company’s ‘About Us’ page. From a review of the materials and advertisements on ‘wuhanbrightchem[.]com’, ‘Wuhan Bright Chemical’ appears completely legitimate. 

Still, links to known precursor traffickers and companies specializing in the import and export of chemicals inspires further investigation of ‘Wuhan Bright Chemical’; it could be coincidental that transdermal fentanyl ‘patches’ increasingly utilize silicone in their construction. In the same way trafficked fentanyl is often hidden in packets of silica, could a legitimate silicone company tell us more about how Chinese fentanyl traffickers hide in plain sight?

‍

4: OSINT Industries, Julian’s ‘Missing Puzzle Piece’

When we asked if he could do what he did without OSINT industries, Julian quickly answered:

“no”.

Julian described OSINT Industries as the “missing puzzle piece” in his investigation of this deadly trade. The ability to investigate phone numbers and emails of suspects and their aliases was “the turning point”. OSINT Industries’ open-source, 100% accurate intelligence allowed him to dig deeper, and uncover the truth when those in power wouldn’t.

‍

‍5: The Hunt Goes On

The hunt for the truth about these Chinese fentanyl networks is far from over. 

Considering where he’ll go from here, Julian is seeking a law enforcement connection to review his findings. He wants his investigation to demonstrate the complacency of not only those fighting the ‘war on drugs’, but social media platforms failing to take responsibility for this trade. 

Julian says his investigation is a clear indictment of social media companies’ quest for engagement at all costs. Soundcloud, Facebook, Twitter (X), Wickr, WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat, Google and more were all shown to openly facilitate narcotics traffic from China - and still do.

Julian has put together a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) profile for Chinese actors offering illicit or semi-illicit narcotics products for overt sale on social media. Investigators should watch out for:

If you feel inspired to join Julian’s hunt for the truth, he suggests:

1. Report ads found on social media. This is often futile, but necessary.
2. Contact your local representative.
3. Hand the evidence you collect to law enforcement or reputable journalists.

‍

* Names and information changed to protect the identities of those involved.